

9-21-15

As I was organizing our ... study

(JFK proposed ...!)

(+JFK was hoping to
make public deal the
next day)

(Sizeland - 1 day)

Having drawn back that
morning from it, also
postponing ending crisis

(Christian - kept driving (driver of car was
drif, and truck had a wire in it)

SPY - B-59

(water, 8-130')

What led to this moment

(Mantley - no days of K leaving
but US aircraft (the real days ...)

not days

blockade

rebo

K reaches

Frontiers

must get in
understand...

Peace Member

Oct. 2002 - known for Aug? (agreed)

What have we learned?

en to
Jul 2003

on the record (class.) nothing...

Pitts

brought
What brought me to 5 PM # 10-27

(File - Torrey calls, DDC's

get: October 8 Kneller?

met to Bum - Chris Wheeler

(was on radio, since 2002?)

Went expressive prosecutive? (Oxford?) (JFK fun of Long /
C-I many it NST?
back...

RFK - what if misses?

* JFK statements 9-3, 9-16 - in linking (K' + NIE')

MEN: End this!

no MRBM's

Sorenson - If we thought

^{suppose JFK, MCB}
"Kearney has it first!"

A had FSR

|| (What JFK found?)

|| suppose PSACM!

(JCS back know - give PSACM
pressure)

JFK has denial mission!

(what front more leads -

"early mission, attacks!"

"If B-54 had covered me..."

(JCS: "...")

[Q are: When did JFK give up intent in mission?

late July, early August - SC committed (Berlin)

(Would JFK have preferred Cuba / Berlin crisis
begin action? or to postpone it (if it was
certain))

D: Blockade give up attack - shuttle long bluff

Seung: NIE doesn't know Mugosa!
Post-Martin
(in in November?!)

OR mission planing,
Oct 1-2

SU: two news

torpedoes

if sub had been "attacked" Oct 24?

Fri night mission = K drivers to baggage
Sat mornig JFK again to baggage

(mainly

AA

U-2 (refers to firing of AA; like Saints)

sub B-59

Fri night? (Remembered: two news (last ing in mission
Okinawa: (over))

Shivers

9-22-15

It was dangerous

> 10%

Others were more

right than he was

and

(I was wrong)

Not for man's public thought

I was right that they were wrong
about that.

(Did JFK commit strategizing like (K wanted
to punch)

JFK had to fool/bluff Congress and VCS/die.
no will at K

(He was too coming to Castro

what he signed!

AA! and

(In the end, he didn't fool VCS! on Cuba or VN

He was naïve of K, wrong,
NATO, US -

or CTB

Just it for VCS (+ for C-I, Kase,

(and that matter?) Boris Wall,
VN, PTB, Am Univ.

(Costs :

(like Chukin?)

He deserves credit for not

doing what hanks wanted: Oct 16-27

But Why deserve credit for W -

at risk of the world
Mach, big long

(against his brother
instincts)

(and for slaying his instincts,
hank's COOP

9-22-15

"We" thought it wasn't a nuclear crisis —
it was!

It was a Berlin-Cuba crisis, as K thought.

It was not purely "Crisis Crisis" as K said,
though partly

K said and intent to press on Berlin,
(after winning challenge in Cuba) as he
said — he wasn't bluffing, or highly deliberately
mis-directing.

(+ he still cared — about GDR
(more than Berlin) & NATO)

— I questioned Oct 22 — "If one (?) is right..."
(I didn't believe either side of this)

I questioned: If 10% chance — ASW?!
(attack?)
(My values were right)

I was not worried about SU MRBMs

Rightly so

or blockade

(except what? Post)

(P~~re~~worked - like TG, Aug 2 1964

ONLY
TIME

Whole stream of decisions brought forward
to that point - where one man did
have to decide, a plausible target,
authentic (was this a - 2 equal) machines/engines
to fire (2 vs. 1)

(like false alarm - Fulton 1993?
Patton - 1983 (Pembury
1962 False alarm)

(N 1969 ?!

PBSG: no mention of Mungson

on falling of ... (Slaughter (sic!) - CW
"destroy" as

(as Berlin

of falling on JFK

on JFK vs. JCS / bombs

9-22-15

This is not a story of the long '60's
or of the Cold War -

It is a story of the nuclear era
which we are still in -

the FS/FD era (now for both
CF, Deep, etc. US, R, I, Is, Pak,
Exposed areas of "commitment" China

distinct

invariable local balance of war-we forces

("neo-colonies")

"road for FD threats"

are opposed

we weren't really involved.

meetings Cuba

not, "turn the other cheek"

SU would force us to use not
any to protect Cuba! (of Berlin!)

- don't American, Cuba!

(missile sales)

So not (anyway) ~~radios~~ ~~was~~ ~~craps~~!
Katon

"to prevent a new war" (OK)

"keep SU from being too strong"

JFK bluff / missile SU rules

as Castro uses refusing

(to not know either to JFK will

make missiles

"ANY NECESSARY!"

- but no more threatening

(at least of missile crisis -

going - both (all) what

not public

9-28-15

FR

Int R knew about VPK death:

- He had to find SAM at 0-2
(Beyon - out of control)
- Costa AA (fully better)

- [have to know]

[have to know]

Ream - miss

Alan F. Phillips

Kind of best of Bryan

1961 - moon BOMBS

first at

Nov 24 '61 (Beyon: Portridge)

Oct 26-27 0-2 into SU 102A with me

Oct 24 62

Oct 25

Oct 26 8AM John Lamer (last)

9-25-15

Is this is not end, what is?

London is Berlin, ...

(What if the case after Babcock
had been decided?)

("If you go first, I will...")
(JFK couldn't back down in front of Clay!)

(Even before K feared pressure from
hanks was proportion
minor major
when there was
consequence!)

("BPM" can beat you out?)

Did JFK want to attack: on Kennedy, etc...
with Thurley (McConnell committed his?!)
("not McKeenan")

Werner, Kyoung

as was he bluffing from beginning,
as from Thursday? Wade

(X)

JFK had not only to (be seen to) take risks, he
had to threaten Werner 1) to reassure JCS, until...

2) to scare public + allies, so they would
3) K? so he will
accept Friday - only, not Berlin except a trade

Carter (xK) was not "paranoid"

or negatively USE hostility
for some part of all his reasons

9-25-15

"We" fear loss of dominance economically in
Europe (new, East Eur)

Japan

Central & North America

Mexico,

to trade with Russia
+ China

on rise of Germany
+ France

R fears: loss of dominance of non-aligned
+ R!

(K might depend for influence in L.A. + TW)

Israel

France allied with Russ

NK

(then, if it could)

Pak

VS. "Better dead than Red"

JFK ~~intended to~~ intention to declare if necessary
can too late to prevent would big meeting
that afternoon

5 o'clock

(Bullfight) critics

It was a bull-fight

argument

CORRIDO

(has bull dead... Russ)

BW on horns

9-24-15

JFK: "Or else" — "I will win" Glee
"I will see in VN
I will

DeGennes

bs

(after saying, ^{JCS} ~~but~~ I will not see
in C-I: ~~to~~ orient balance
He seemed to promote his ~~vision~~
[the ~~the~~ hobby] "control" his
(also, CBI in VN?)
He would have learned
(Disposal problem)

Peterson is, ~~240~~ in Office

(was, Lygia? long? (Hobell, afternoon)
= VN '67)

9-22-15

JFK couldn't have quit by Sunday
morning

or afternoon?

K might have quit by Sunday
evening (OC) - 24 hrs

JFK had given his word Monday night
(RFR to me)

So JFK could hold off quitting
until (Monday afternoon)

K couldn't

Without C, JFK wins, too - K can't
wait 45-48 hours, JFK can.

Thanks to C (+ two more) K quits Sunday morning,

no "fighting
blunder"

instead of Sunday evening or Monday

If subs haven't blown up...

Rosen: check!

(B-36 on surface - didn't explode)

Sullivan:

"alters" (or drill it? Maybe!)

K Error: orders to ^{be ready to} attack Pearl Harbor

only divides

+ Hunters

and subs

+ mission fleet!

(Not, Turkey!)

w. us

even in GW?

no CBMs
or Pearl!

well, no need to
prepare for that!

WATO: bluff or not? after ... 1958? 1960?
9-22-15

System I
System II external SU "umbrella" over Cuba / Egypt 1973?
System b internal (only real case? (1969: N/VN?))

System III
known; seen; many CW
System II 3 are out; like US & UR two wars
other non-war US on Europe (1 paper)
attack/stabilize on Berlin (Stalin)

now, over eastern Ukraine!

"Umbrella" — minimum (deliberately misleads,
massing)
like Star Wars "shield" "dome" Chrome Dome
(VCS — are shield!)

rather, instead of real strategic
deterrence

(non-fears: checks)
clock)

"Now on for threat" — BLUFFING

yet — not entirely

C-II — each believed other's bluff

enough to be deterred from attacking — but

not of COSE-BOSE
COSE

not from bluffing, threat (bluffing + taking some risk

X

(externalities
IGNORED.)

C-II by Sept. 30? out 10?

(unreasonable,
unfathomable,
Balthazar but
of kind of iron

to Navy: cut down C-II

80-90%

+ FU cans

Danger: 2 NWS:

A) US-R

B) Arab-Pak

C → as many doctors

C) Armed or US vs. NNWS

as Cherchez or US vs. crisis in WWII

1-2M?

~ .9 + .6 + .3 = 1.8M

(m 9 + .3 + ? = US deliberate kill win (Terror)

Friendship is Madison's Bluff

"I will" (real) \rightarrow I may

(less real;
but still real,
billable,
uncommensal
intolerable
+ backing still, now)

(the campaign of 2016
= 2004/08 (the)
this time, vs. NWS

NOW - MAOs & both?!

(no if $A = (B =) C$

Even without snake/winter,

John was wrong - 1982

on what 1961 - as estimated by

VCS: not $1/4$ of usual pop,

or $\frac{1}{3}$ (18): more like $(\frac{1}{2})$ (i.e. 50 mcs),

in 1982, pop. was?

$\Rightarrow A = C$

" = "Hiroshi (A-
base)"

which really

= business (or, less)

(no more!)

Burnin/Worson \rightarrow County / Bluff / Henry, Bismarck, Fargo,
Rathbun, $\rightarrow H + N \rightarrow 100$ SU arts (A) (64+)

$\rightarrow \underline{H} \rightarrow$ ^{SIOP-62; Blair Park -}
~~DM~~ true winter

Blair Park: Blair - Park (100A)

= VCS ext of SIOP-62 ($\frac{1}{3}$ pop)

and usual SIOP-62 is a DM (98-99%)

Rebeck - saws cut lines on MT; ^{yield}

In 1961, big MT, big yield -

has (P) under the side of ^{valleys}
much smaller MT is smaller, more numerous
grasses & small valleys on
large cut - now
more than 1 large yield!

Calos. now takes a fine MT of small yields
to get MT of scale

9-22-10

WJ "call" sub to answer
(of what?)

outside guarantee
Orlov - review of 5-59

My app: to ^{try to} ~~place~~
DUSK
JCS (like bluebook)

Melvin Commission of History (Newington)
Hay Sloughs Come Off, Cong

Long NO

Wanted K have him willing to cover
(within 5 days) - as I expected - on
Oct 28 or Oct 29

within 5 days of Castro starting
over on 28th? as I expected?

yes - he wants, Friday night -
if ORK had held fast - as I wanted?
- EEC

(What did Excom expect, Sat?!)
in opposing Friday deal?!

What would small group have said
about Post-Castro deal (which barren
didn't have what? Sat night -
on Sunday, if ORK offer rejected?
Other, what? attack?!

Bath Bluff:
But K wouldn't have had to - his bluff would
JFK didn't want on that: (C was wild card)

Stewart?

Cathy Bruchie ASW officer on ?

2-21-15

One more ~~step~~ — JFK didn't "know" to

but that was not because JFK simply
saw, "No" as threatened attack
as it fairly appeared : because

but because it was:

JFK was about to lose control
of his ability to hold off attack,
waiting for K to agree
(or, to give in brief)

JFK couldn't stop mean

and couldn't deter attacks on mean
by threatening K, especially
because (he didn't know)

K couldn't stop attacks
because mean was getting closer
(K came to me)

JFK couldn't organize

JFK had to avoid public protests by OCS
(leaks, threats, negotiations)

that was choice, weak, treason

or what the proposal (like CAS '65) [didn't look in 1961, 1962, 1963
by doing (giving this) at least 1) blockade
2) mean (and 3) (maybe)
(SAC) + OCSF

9-21-15

Over Abuse starts:

- Mil. in control (with the arms)

- EAG: to protect troops, "win"

- Pre-plans

- Can't "lose," must "win"

(or "betake," "trying to win")

Can't let troops "die in vain"

"unnecessary"

Honor, prestige

"fail" (banned to fail)

(w/ country)

C-II Reinforced threat: first to shoot

talking all while

talk, to SAGs, AA

- mission

shooting "Lima," "RT" - conclude

1970, CFR

no regrets!

no regrets! (as in WW II battle!)

torture / terror

didn't want for leaders,
either? as in Japan!

9-15-15

Jan 10-23

1

Crisis ended as I expected - K withdrew

but I wouldn't
have expected
at all

& thought - "no chance" of war - Cuba or Turkey

But not for reasons I supposed

Cuba (I supposed
Cuba)

Not only because K was outgunned

in Cuba [I wasn't!] and strategically

[40K troops, with two ^{was} (he was) (Eve?)

he could have destroyed 2nd Fleet?!

& one torpedo! (?)

Not because JFK just had fun, thought
(K didn't have to quit 36 hrs before deadline.)

NOR, BECAUSE ~~because~~ of VLT.

and he deployed

K ^{did he quit} could have won - with more de more,

SAFES, two more, troops

and much more

(His flaw: Too much ^{deliberate + subtle} strategy, too long! CA

(and deployment of weapons,
too soon!) [too little control

He could have won

of Castro, SAFES,
two more!)

as late as Friday or (Monday,
Sat.)

(Wanted JFK and delayed occupation
of his office but more if he'd
known - K had told (Friday night!)

missing from his letter

[and knowledge of
Mongoose, assass

unknown to JFK?

Wanted CIA-Mafia-Cuba

? wanted together on assass. Castro AND JFK or NOV. 22 JFK assass.
CIA-Mafia: C-I 1960-68

VFR (as I know last night) went
going to hotel first

He was to go ^{Stennis route}
Sunday or Monday

AREA JFK

^{VFR} He didn't expect month short - close ^{Sunday}

or know what he would do (avoid night flows
+ U-2

(Was sent Sunday morning?)

K didn't "panic" and began, by
begin of ^{deliberate} ~~minute~~ ^{PANIC} JB started busy morning
1 day would short broadcast Sunday
night, ^{Moscow} ^{Marble} (busy morning DC)

^{Private}
~~Private~~ deal is much less than
K proposed - almost worthless
worldless.

Issue: Why did K quit - accept
VFR proposal ("=" his worried "offer"
of Friday night, expecting imminent invasion
(unwilling) - what he was willing to settle
for when he expected ^{deliberate} imminent invasion
(as of ^{Wed?} Thursday - "see what we can get,
≥ no-invasion pledge)

- when + as he did - when he was no longer
worried (Sunday morning, Moscow - about imminent ^{deliberate} invasion -

cont. — and RFK had given his mother 12-36 hours, to decide
on bargaining? Why did he act as if invasion was upon him
(< 12 hours), like timing right? What had been? — St. H. Carter, A.A. 4p (3)
Crisis ended — when act as it did — too
much

because events were getting/had gotten
out of control of either K or JFK
and were fast approaching an irreversible
explosion;

and JFK was ignorant of the
danger his forces were facing
(K hadn't told him) (he couldn't imagine
his advisors)

but K knew, knew that JFK didn't
know — his ^{K's} knowledge of recent risks
meant he (knew he) had to be the one
to back off, back down — accept an
offer on the table from his opponent;
he had let things go to a point
where there was no time left
(before a possible explosion)
to ripen his opponent
or to make a counter-offer.

K didn't know:

— JFK was on the verge of
accepting his last offer (perhaps next day)
~~PROK~~ (- sub dual: that would have
confirmed his decision)

JFK wanted to
accept last. moving

BIG SECRET

JFK didn't know:

- Castro out of K's control - hence, JFK's
(see No 1)

- Two more (no PALS; foreign delegation; out of K's ^{control}

- 40 K SU troops

- SAM out of K's control

K didn't know:

- US missiles out of JFK's control (hence,

- US destroyers out of JFK's control.

(Varying from

U-2 over SU

K did not "lose" / quit when he did

(dropouts late morning DC ~~later~~ pre - U-2/SAM

K ~~option~~ - Tank track

(≈ minutes staying in Cuba

U-2 Pol

AA

(sub-dual)

so, there

gives his his

new advantage

in Berlin, ≈ missiles

Does he quit up

Cuba? No!

two more do stay, + no - mission change

(helps K in Berlin, like ICBMs:

- which US-SU equality

- demonstrates NATO, undermines US

cred and leadership

(Will US sacrifice cities for Berlin?

when it remains NATO mission

to get Cuban missiles withdrawn?

And can't threaten SU missiles out

without a trade?

He can see,

two more one

under control of

local command

(402): more convincing

than NATO/US protection of

Berlin (more valuable than Cuba) (protected by US ICBMs; as K claimed by Cuba, 1961!

So, bluff - friendship - making intimidating displays
 over threats (animals, birds, gorillas) on the edge of
 a prelude (without any intention swerve/mimic)

What if Castro had shot down 2 planes (it hit!)
 as intimidating? or sanitary? or US interrupted?

Could JFK really have

1)

and brought both - & the covered - close to
 an expression

(and our - K - knew it, better than JFK.

JFK found ultimate means by K

SAPE

AA

which he hoped to disturb by threats

(but wasn't sure he would succeed)

actually, K (knew he) was not in


control: Castro (& his peeps!) were

not under his control, nor his SAPE!

(verities?)

(nor JFK's chatterbox!)


OK! AA-WA!



RF:
 "I am
 sliding
 toward
 peace":
 "I will
 stop"
 HIPPOS

One driver playing Chicken (K) knows
 he is losing brake fluid fast (or his steering
 wheel is coming loose) - he is about to lose
 control - and knows the other driver doesn't know it's

(no., openly throwing out steering wheel; when brake, start ^{SWERVE.}

(~~Diagram~~ Figure:  tank

tank stopped; like RF for me, & Shirley

but: second, ball-layer

Briggs Wilson

loss of control:

At a certain point (when slots are finally
exchanged)

Events get out of control, top,
control: leaders (if they survive) (or not)
can't stop, brake, manipulate, change plans

- Cover breaks down (final few moves!)

- lower-levels must make choices, without
waiting to inform higher commands or for their
reply: inferior

9 might follow old plans

- pressure on lower commands: "about to die" (Scout)
or "target about to disappear,"
others are being

shot commander

- going to lose moves

first mistakes
in move war

(oblivious)

- pressure on Pres - from unl.
from Congress

(possible infringement, or comp)

"no choice"

Kiss - shots in Madison Square
Court to Pass - he flees

7

Armed flees

Massachusetts - prison (Chris)

Batman flees

Thin flees

(Din does not -
till too late)

Denver does not -

till too late

Costa does not

GVN does not, in 1964-65

Ho does not

Garber - camp

JFK - shoot

(MLK, Malcolm X, RFK

(like Tarjillo, Din with JFK
not Costa)

(.

I thought:

= All JFK had to do was say,
 "Get the out" (you have no business,
 no mail, no rights (you're #2) to
 have the them)
 or we'll blow the up" (me to Dick)
 and stay with that: "see me tomorrow"
 and K had to do it - and deployment
 and he said it.

I was right.

Risk was $1/100$ ($1/1000$ ^{Asr})

But Mike was right: (why?)
 on prob. He knew balance. (?)
 did he believe it?

K might not get out, and right away
 to "call on bluff" (JFK was bluffing,
 though VCS not)

and 1) JFK might not be bluffing, abstain
^{low prob.}
MRBMs go off

(Mike didn't know of the war,
 rules, SAC, AA out of control, especially
 "or SAC does something" (not O prob.))

anyway, both present in threats
 while fences operate in Cont.

A + DS + VCS
 know right about that

or K meets in Berlin, Turkey
 (really low prob. - but not in JFK yes!)

and 10% of or higher:

crisis persists, to a point
where forces are operating in
an environment of conflict
under a spark (the intention
invariable etc.) is likely, and higher
the 10% is S-R

see WWI

(not fact in China
or (Pearl Harbor)
or Hitch

10% chance crisis will lead to a
saturation, where

like Berlin → Oct - 1961

(Wg was K still pushing us in
Berlin - after first speech
NEW WALL

NIE - Rulphat

deadline dropped?

Lighter - tanks

WWK - "most dangerous" moment
(not knowing, saturation)

Our foothold in Ukraine / Kiev = Crimea?
 include = Berlin?

in R "empire" (Divided Ukraine: VN
 East Ukraine = Crimea for R/Putin
 Berlin (included)
 Kazakhstan

"I'm not going to lose it;

"It's threatened; I'll threaten EU"

or hand-over [Recent ^{Crimea, Kiev} ~~acquisition~~: threatened of "port
 offshore islands of "natural resources"
 (China, Germany, US)

South VN

(South Korea)

(Korean 1958)

"Nuclear Option"

Extremely disproportionate threat

(to carry out: illegal, immoral
act, to threaten? risk?

violating mutual (+ neutral)
devastation

supposedly, threat
violates "no risk"
(bluff; if you do it,
I can & will control it;
1/100, 1/1000, negligible
like a. i. 6/14

- Nothing risk of Cong. filibuster

- Defaulting on ^{US} gov debt
Sanction gov down

"Nuclear Strategy" - Brexit - defaulting on gov debt
- ~~leaving~~ leaving EU (or, EC)

(the new GW

Committee (not, threats; simply, refusal/ failure
to coop. on restrictions (costly: opportunity
of profits;
600
Costs of Transition

DE:

We don't know how/
feel/act (as if I will know)
"which is more likely:
and that is \neq ="

Probes
(Charging.)

{ That some it will be carried out
not sure it merit

Technically not definite (relative) facts (not just, not proven; not $>$, $<$, $=$)
"not definite relation"
"vague" Lawson, Prober

WK0507

9-30-15

All demons have a capacity for (being in) Denial.

All demons, all the time, are in denial about things.

(Fortunately, not everyone is in denial about everything all the time).

(Vs. Heisen - you can find denial of the public example of the time.*

* = many all.

Christ (cf?) "Heisen ^{been} cannot ~~stand~~ the very much reality." 4 Quartets

Heisen: "I may not know the truth."

"any man will deny known truth," (?)

Heisen, every thought of every human being is an act - an act, not bluff.

- not an act at all
- not an act at all
- or not believed, not bluff, blow up air.

and that was great -

It was dangerous - not (very lesson)
became with JFK & K ^{much} more
reckless than any before or after

(Well, K was;
not more than A?)

or the (JFK) GWB?...

but became this thanks

inadvertently left something to chance (>0)

TCS

Bankruptcy

(Rise to US from US FS level less than
almost again improved in US:

but not to Europe, Eurasia!

(or really, to world - still:
that

0) Effect of US FS -

1) Warning Rise of US attack on Cuba - warning -
was incredibly greater than again in US knew
for 30 years!

2) and VCS (or VFR) pressure / desire to
attack (in ignorance) far greater than any.
(not-ward of Moscow & Warsaw) injured!

(Fortunately, CBI was also unwilling of VCS less
awkward, the necessity of VFR decreased!)

9-1-15

On War Plans + Alliances

Meeting: K rejects notion of
"misadventure"

Yet it is a constant threat
in his decision-making

C Berlin

Wells "test"

Saw plans ~~for~~ for Europe!

C-II

(Stalin: Korea)

and JFK's: (C-I) C-II

Blockade)

(+ H, (CBI - Laos!))

Note pretty minor in!

He could / should have succeeded
would have if:

even given ^{these} except for Castro

(Admiral all wrong)

8-30-15

The danger of new war is intenable 10 PM
and unavoidable (unending, unregulated
not-intable, avoidable)
not because of (many, or limited to)

- Proving beyond US - D ~~the~~ or beyond Plan-5
(Exp. ~~show~~, ~~not~~, ~~hard~~
NK
- Proving beyond ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ?
(from...)

- Proving to "Congo, Congo state"
(Kongo belong groups, etc.
my degrees)

or to less product, more needs

harder than US product or in SU usually seen

It's impossible any of length, even
product (Congo to improve K needs -

"How could be have
the fit be could"

Hobbes

to need that rich were

Geddon...

just despite this being more caution
than they appeared (or pretended to be)

and as caution or (hardness)

we can expect, even can't politics;

Rails are as great new - (Congo front policy)

(4) called his bluff (grace, Bill Clinton)
Muhommed

and his own to lose Greece

⇒ Euro balance, across Berlin (GDR)
and f

Could have worked: giving ability to purchase
blockade, it should have worked!

Point: Would almost blow up
NOT measure with K & SEK
was extraordinary measure

or so leaders/belief/oppression
into the approval + facilitated during crisis;
(bluff)

It was not more necessary than
current state

(or, say, Britain - Pak

(don't say: OK (?))

(measured to for!)

or OBL/AQ-1

(1915 - We are not good "politeness"

(us. controlled oppression, yes

or, counting it!)

esp. now is OK

In late 1958 (after Berlin W.C.) K secretly deploys
ARMY to QDR — to threaten Korea & Pots.

(after Aug '56).

(NOT good enough — no. "hostages")

and not break US monopoly of power
to destroy control of affairs — 1st or 2nd

C-II

Dear K

withdrawing

end of - year deadline
on Phase I/II/60R

(don't for dev's!)

recognition!

(could reform?)

Admission? R?

Admission?)

before 1980?

or, fine out another
it?

"No gap" [auto:
10x US]

4 (auto)